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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
MINNIE PEARL DALTON, as Administratrix of the Estate of James
F. Dalton, deceased, and MINNIE
PEARL DALTON,
Plaintiff and Appell'ant,

Case No.
8568

vs.
MAX DALTON, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The parties will be referred to as in the Court below.
All italics are ours.
B.

THE FACTS

In this case the plaintiff filed an action to quiet title
to the following described real property in San Juan County,
State of Utah:
"The West half of the Northeast quarter, the
Southeast Quarter of the Northwest quarter and
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the Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of
Section Twenty-six in Township Thirty-six South
of Range Twenty-four East, Salt Lake Meridian,
Utah, containing 160 acres.
"Together with all improvements and appurtenances thereunto belonging."
The defendants Max Dalton and Nell Dalton filed an
answer denying the ownership by the plaintiffs and alleged
that they are the owners of said real property subject only
to a mortgage to the Mutual Life Insurance Company of
New York (R. 7). The plaintiff Minnie Pearl Dalton, as
the administratrix of the estate of James F. Dalton and in
her personal capacity, claims title to the property by virtue
of a patent from the United States Government issued on
the 29th day of November, 1927 (Def. Ex. 5, p. 10).
The defendants Max Dalton and Nell Dalton, his wife,
claimed title from a chain of title derived from Daniel
Perkins, and that the said James F. Dalton and lVlinnie
PearI Dalton conveyed their interest in said property to
Daniel Perkins by warranty deed dated October 27, 1930
(Def. Ex. 1).
The plaintiff denies that the said warranty deed (Def.
Ex. 1) was ever executed by the said James F. Dalton and
Minnie Pearl Dalton, and that the property was ever conveyed to Daniel Perkins by said warranty deed.
The defendants Max Dalton and his wife Nell Dalton
offered evidence as part of their affirmative defense that
they were the fee owners of the property, that the plaintiff
Minnie Pear1 Dalton and James F. Dalton, deceased, exe-
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cuted a warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) to Daniel Perkins, and
that at the time of the execution of the deed an escrow
agreement was signed and the deed placed with the San
Juan State Bank, Monticello, Utah, in escrow (Def. Ex. 2),
and that they derived the title to the property described in
plaintiff's complaint by a chain of title from Daniel Perkins
to the said Max Dalton and Nell Dalton, his wife, defendants.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
DECEASED JAMES F. DALTON AND HIS
WIFE lVIINNIE PEARL DALTON EXECUTED
THE WARRANTY DEED DATED OCTOBER
27, 1930 (DEF. EX. 1), TO DANIEL PERKINS.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT· THE
ESCROW AGREEMENT (DEF. EX. 2) HAD
BEEN COMPLIED WITH, AND THE WARRANTY DEED DATED OCTOBER 27, 1930
AND ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED BY JAMES F.
DALTON AND MINNIE PEARL DALT·ON,
GRANTORS, AND LEFT IN ESCROW WITH
THE SAN JUAN STATE BANK HAD BEEN
VALIDLY DELIVERED.
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POINT III.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE DEFENDANT MAX DALTON HAD
ACQUIRED TITLE TO THE PROPERTY BY
VIRTUE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT· TO SUSTAIN THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
DECEASED JAMES F. DALTON AND HIS
WIFE MINNIE PEARL DALTON EXECUTED
THE WARRANTY DEED DATED OCTOBER
27, 1930 (DEF. EX. 1), TO DANIEL PERKINS.

Plaintiff contends that the evidence is insufficient to
support the court's finding that James F. Dalton and
Minnie Pearl Dalton signed and executed the purported
warranty deed dated October 27, 1930 (Def. Ex. 1).
The deed purports to have been executed on the 27th
day of October, 1930 (Def. Ex. 1). The instrument purports
to bear the signatures of both James F. Dalton, deceased,
and Minnie Pearl Dalton, his wife. The preponderance of
the evidence in this case establishes that the deed was
never executed by Mr. and Mrs. Dalton.
The· defendants produced an alleged deed which purports to have been signed by both Mr. and Mrs. James F.
Dalton October 27, 1930, and the deed first appears and
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was recorded November 5, 1948, by the defendants, eighteen
years after its execution. The deed itself recites that the
grantors were residents of Cortes, County of Montezuma,
Colorado, and was signed on the 27th day of October, 1930,
but was acknowledged on the 28th day of October, 1930 by
Frank Halls, Notary Public, residing in Monticello, San
Juan County, Utah.
Frank Halls, the Notary Public who acknowledged the
said deed, called as a witness, testified that the deed was
not prepared by him, but was prepared before it was presented to him for his acknowledgement (Trans. 33). Mr.
Halls further testified (Trans. 30-31) :
"Q. Mr. Halls, was that document signed in
your presence as a Notary Public?
"A. Well, I would say so, yes.
"Q. Were you acquainted with James F. Dalton's signature aside from this notarized signature?
"A. Yes, acquainted with James F. Not Minnie
Pearl.
"Q. Would you say this was James F. Dalton's
signature?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Would you say that was Minnie Pearl
Dalton's signature?
"A. I would say so if I acknowledged it, yes."
Mr. Halls further testified he was sure that the signature of James F. Dalton in Defendant's Exhibit 1 was Mr.
Dalton's signature, but he was not sure it was Mrs. Dalton's
signature (Trans. 32) :
"Q. Now, just a moment, please. Answer the
question. Why are you so sure it was the Daltons?
"A. I am not sure it was her signature. I am
sure it was Dalton's, all right."
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Mr. Halls further testified (Trans. 32) :
Did you see Mrs. Dalton any time in 1930?
"A. I don't know now. I can't go back years.
Dalton worked for me one year down there on my
farm.
"Q.

You specifically remember that Mrs. Dalton came in and signed a paper before you?
"A. No.
"Q.

Do you specifically remember that Mrs.
Dalton came in and signed this paper before you?
"A. N o.
"Q.

"Q. You wouldn't swear that she came before
you and signed this paper?
"A. No, I don't remember the circumstances
at all."

The witness frankly admitted he did not remember the
circumstances, but the witness was sure the deed bore the
signature of Mr. Dalton, but he was not sure that it was
the signature of Mrs. Dalton. Now, Mr. Halls was permitted to testify over the objection of plaintiff's counsel
that it was his practice to have the people present before
him before he would take their acknowledgements and
therefore she must have appeared before him; and it is
on this testimony alone that the court based its findings
that Mrs. Dalton signed the deed.
The testimony of Mr. Halls, which was elicited by his
counsel in redirect examination over the objection of plaintiff's counsel that it was his custom to have people personally present at the time he acknowledged an instrument
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should be given very little credence, because of the testimony of Mr. Halls in his direct examination (Trans. 32) :
Do you specifically remember that Mrs.
Dalton came in and signed this paper before you?
"A. No.
"Q.

You wouldn't swear that she came before
you and signed this paper?
"A. No, I don't remember the circumstances at
all."
"Q.

Now, if it 'vere a fact that it had been the practice of
Mr. Halls not to acknowledge a paper unless the persons
were present and there had never been any departures
from this practice, the witness would not have so testified.
If it were in fact his practice to have every person present
before he acknowledged the instrument and he had never
departed from that practice, there would have been no
hesitation in swearing that Mrs. Dalton had appeared before him and signed the purported deed (Def. Ex. 1), but
he was not sure and he 'vould not swear under oath that
she appeared before him and executed the purported deed
(Def. Ex. 1).
That Mrs. Minnie Pearl Dalton never appeared before
the Notary Public Halls and executed said purported warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) is supported by the preponderance
of the testimony. The instrument itself recites that the
grantors were residents of Cortes, Montezuma County,
Colorado. There is no evidence that James F. Dalton and
Minnie Pearl Dalton ever lived in Cortes, Montezuma
County, Colorado.
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Vve wish to bring to the attention of this court that
Defendants' Exhibit 2, purporting to be a copy of a letter
addressed to the State Bank of San Juan, Monticello, Utah,
refers to a purported written agreement by and between
the said James F. Dalton and George W. Perkins, Hyrum
C. Perkins, and Daniel Perkins, all of Blanding, Utah, dated
the 27th day of October, 1930. The letter reads in part as
follows:
"I hand you herewith a deed to said property
under the terms of which the same is transferred to
Daniel Perkins, one of said co-partners, and you
are instructed the same is transferred to Daniel
Perkins upon payment to me of the balance due on
said contract according to its terms, or to return
the same to me if default is made in making such
:payments or any of them."

The terms are then set out.
This exhibit of the defendants recites on its face that
the deed (Def. Ex. 1) was delivered to and accepted by
the bank on the 27th day of October, 1927. The following
day, October 28, the deed was acknowledged by Mr. Halls.
The signatures were on the deed before the deed was presented to Prfr. Halls [O'r acknowledgement. Yet 1\fr. Halls
testified under oath that the document was signed in his
presence as a Notary Public (Trans. 30) :
"Q. Now, lVIr. Halls, I am going to hand you
what is marked for identification 'Defendant's Exhibit 1,' and ask you if you can identify your signature on that docu1nent.
"A. Yes.
"Q. lV[r. Halls, zcas that document signed in
your presence as a Notary Public?
''A. Well, I '''"ould say so, yes.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

Were you acquainted with James F. Dalton's signature aside from this notarized signature?
"A. Yes, acquainted with James F. Not Minnie
Pearl.
"Q.

Would you say that this is James F. Dalton's signature?
"A. Yes.
"Q.

Would you say that is Minnie Pearl Dalton's signature?
"A. I would say so if I acknowledged it, yes."
"Q.

It is quite apparent that the witness did not identify
the signature by reason of the fact that she appeared before him and signed the deed, but from his. memory of
James F. Dalton's signature, vvhich he had been familiar
with many years previous.
Defendants' Exhibit 2 shovvs on its face that deed was
executed and signed on the 17th day of October, 1930 and
delivered by Mr. Dalton to the bank in escrow. At the
time of the deli very of the deed to the bank to be held in
escrow the signatures of James F. Dalton and Minnie Pearl
Dalton must have been put on the deed at that time. Now
if Mr. and Mrs. Dalton were in the bank at the time the
deed was signed and delivered to the bank to be held in
escrow, it seems almost incredible that the bank did not
require them to acknowledge the deed before it was. received by the bank in escrovv, which most certainly is the
practice of every bank. Every fact and circumstance in
this transaction seems to indicate that even if the deed was
signed by Mr. Dalton, Mrs. Dalton did not sign this purported deed. Defendants' Exhibit 2 purports to have type-
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written on the bottom of said instrument, under the signature of James F. Dalton, the purported original agreement
to sell the property, and the instrument does not purport to
be signed by Mrs. Minnie Pearl Dalton, so that it is undisputed that Mrs. Minnie Pearl Dalton never at any time
signed any agreement to sell this property to Daniel Perkins. Now there is an escrow agreement appearing over
the signature of James F. Dalton which recites that "I hand
you herewith a deed," etc., signed only by James F. Dalton
and it is not purported to bear the signature of Minnie
Pearl Dalton. It seems only reasonable to assume that if
Mrs. Dalton was actually in Monticello on the 27th day of
October, 1930, the day they claim she signed the said deed,
and was present when the deed was signed, it seems almost
incredible that the bank and lVIr. Perkins would not have
requested her to sign the escrow agreement also, at the
same tin1e she signed the deed and the deed was delivered
to the bank. Mrs. Dalton testified that she never at any
time signed the said deed (Trans. 105).
Riley Dalton, a son of J\iinnie Pearl Dalton, called as
a witness, testified (T·rans. 74) :
"Q. Calling your attention to about the 27th
day of October, 1920, do you know where you were
living?
"A. Living at Declo, Idaho.
"Q. Where did you liYe previous to that?
"A. We lived in Montezun1a Canyon?
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

there?
"A.

Is that in Utah?
That is in San Juan County.
San Juan County. And when did you live
In 1927.
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"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

And you lived where in Idaho?
Declo, Idaho.
How long did you live up there?
From about '27 to '31.
'31?
1931.
1931?
Yes.

Now, was your father and mother-do you
recall them leaving Idaho at any time?
"A. N o, sir.
.
"Q.

Was it their custom to leave you alone
and go places?
"A. N o, sir.
.
"Q.

"Q.
"A.

Did they ever?
N o, sir.
.

Did they leave Idaho for any purpose or
for any place, to go any place about 1930?
"A. N o, sir.
.
"Q.

"Q.
"A.

During the year 1920?
N o, sir.
.

Now, how can you remember that?
"A. 1ffy birthday is the 18th day of October,
I was nine years and ten days old when that deed
was supposed to be executed. We had the measles
on my birthday.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.

You had the measles on your birthday?
y es, sir.
.

And you say your father and mother were
both there?
"A. My father and mother was both there.
"Q.
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"Q.

when?
"A.

That is in the month of October of 19
1930.

1930?
"A. Yes.

"Q.

"Q. Now did you-you came from Idaho in
about 1931, is that true?
"A. Yes, sir."

Belva Isabel Conrad, a daughter of the plaintiff Minnie
Pearl Dalton, testified (Trans. 86) :
Now, calling your attention to the 27th
day of October, 1930, do you know where you were
living?
.
"A. y es, sir.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

Where were you living?
I was living at Declo, Idaho.
Declo, Idaho. Whom were you living with?
My mother.
Your mother is Mrs. Minnie Pearl Dalton?
y es, sir.
.

Now, why were you living with your
mother at that time?
"A. Because I had a young son, a young baby.
"Q.

And when was that baby born?
"A. The 11th day of July, 1930.
"Q. The 11th day of July, 1930?
"Q. I show you what has been marked for
identfication Plaintiff's Proposed Exhibit 2. Is that
the birth certificate of your son?
"A. That is the birth certificate of my son,
Roy \V. Knudsen.
"Q.
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"Q. And he was born on the 11th day of July,
1930 in Declo, Idaho?
"A. y es, sir.
.

Belva Catherine Oliver, a daughter of Mrs. James F.
Dalton, testified (Trans. 91) :
"Q.

attention
were you
"A.
at Declo,

And James Franklin Dalton. Calling your
to the 27th day of October, 1930, where
living?
I was living with my mother and father
Idaho.

How long did you live there, for a considerable time both before and after that?
"A. Yes.
"Q.

\Vhat makes you remember that you were
there specifically on the 27th of November- ( October)?
"A. Well, I had a love affair, I thought I was
in love with a young gentleman at that time. His
name was George King. And my brothers and
mother all had the measles except I.
"Q.

Now, was it the practice of your father
and mother to leave you and go away for a day or
two at a time?
"A. No sir.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.

They never did at any time?
Never.

Particularly around the first to the 27th
of October, 1930, did they leave you?
"A. Neither my mother nor dad could never
leave us at that time.
"Q.

Do you ever remember a time that they
went and left you for a day at a time?
"A. No.
"Q.
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Did they have a car?
"A. Well, w-e had part of one."

"Q.

We submit that the evidence in this record clearly
establishes that Mr. and Mrs. James F. Dalton never executed the warranty deed ( Def. Ex. 1), and particularly
Mrs. James F. Dalton. The evidence is entirely insufficient
to sustain the court's finding that James F. Dalton and
Minnie Pearl Dalton executed the said warranty deed, and
most certainly is insufficient to support the finding that
Mrs. lVIinnie Pearl Dalton ever signed and executed the said
warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1), through which deed defendants claim a chain of title to the property.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ESCROW AGREEMENT (DEF. EX. 2) HAD
BEEN COMPLIED WITH, AND THE WARRANTY DEED D.i\TED OCTOBER 27, 1930
AND ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED BY JAMES F.
DALTON AND MINNIE PEARL DALTON,
GRANTORS, AND LEFT IN ESCROW WITH
THE SAN JUAN STATE BANK HAD BEEN
VALIDLY DELIVERED.
Defendants' Exhibit 2, which purports to be an escrow
agreement executed by James F. Dalton and the San Juan
State Bank, which escro\\r agreement was offered in evidence by the defendant Max Dalton himself, conclusively
proves that if James F. Dalton and Minnie Pearl Dalton
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in fact executed the warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) to Daniel
Perkins on the 27th day of October, 1930, the deed was
placed in the San Juan State Bank in escrow with instructions that the deed be delivered to Daniel Perkins upon
the performancy by Daniel Perkins of the conditions of
the agreement. There is absolutely no evidence in the record that the conditions of the escrow agreement were ever
performed by Daniel Perkins or any of the Perkins brothers.
By the great weight of authority, where a deed has
been executed by the grantors and delivered by the grantors
to an escrow agent, the title to the property does not vest
in the grantee until all the terms and conditions of the
escrow agreement have been complied with. The rule is
stated in 30 C. J. S. page 1216:
"It is frequently or broadly stated that the escrow takes effect as a fully executed instrument at
the time it is rightfully delivered by the depository
to the grantee, obligee, or payee. However it is
held that an actual manual delivery of an escrow
is not necessary to vest the title; that a constructive
delivery may be sufficient and the instrument takes
effect the moment the conditions have been performed or the event happens upon which grantee or
obligee is entitled to possession."
In the case of Shelton vs. Stagg, (169 S. W. 2nd 550)
the court said:
"The law is well settled in this state and in the
state of Wisconsin, as well as practically every other
jurisdiction in the country, that where an instrument is placed in escrow it cannot become operative
until the conditions under which it was deposited
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have been complied with or the contingency agreed
upon has happened."
In Bell vs. Rudd, (191 S. W. 2nd 289) the court held:
"It is elementary that before a grantee or
obligee can assert any rights under an escrow contract, he must show that he has complied with the
escrow."
In Mississippi Highway Commission vs. Anderson, (184
Southern 450) the court said :
"Where a deed is given to a third person to be
delivered as operative only upon the performance of
specific acts by the grantee, there is no delivery that
will place title until the specific acts have been
performed as specified."
The rule is also stated in 19 A. M. J. 437:
"\Vhen an instrument has been deposited in
escrow to be delivered to a designated person upon
the performance of a certain condition or the happening of a certain event, it is the well-established
general rule that the performance of the stipulated
conditions or the happening of the event is essential in order to entitle the beneficiary to a delivery
of the instrument, although in some instances by
fiction of law and in the furtherance of justice it
is allowed to take effect fro1n the first delvery."
There is not one word of evidence in this record that
the money was paid and the conditions of the escrow agree•
ment performed, while Mrs. Dalton testified that no payments had ever been made to them under the terms of any
agreement (Trans. 104). There is absolutely no evidence
that the deed was ever delivered by the escrow agent, the
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San Juan State Bank, to Daniel Perkins, the grantee named
in the deed, or to any of the Perkins brothers mentioned
in the escrow agreement.
In order for the deed to be operative to convey the, title
to the property to the grantee, there must be a delivery of
the deed to the grantee and until the delivery was made
the title did not pass.
Now it may be conceded that possession of a deed by
the grantee creates a presumption that the deed was delivered to the grantee, but this is only a presumption and
may be rebutted (Stanley vs. Stanley, 94 P. 2nd 465). But
this general rule that the possession of a deed by the grantee
creates a presumption that the deed was delivered does not
apply where a deed has been executed and placed in the
hands of an escrow agent for delivery to the grantee upon
performance by the grantee of the conditions of the escrow
(16 A. M. J. 654).
"The fact that a conveyance is found in the
possession of a grantee does not give rise to the
presumption of its delivery where the evidence shows
that such conveyance, though signed by the grantor,
was given to a depository with instructions respecting it which as a matter of law show that the grantor
did not part with the right to recall it in his lifetime."
There is not one word of evidence in this record that
the warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) alleged to have been executed by Mr. and Mrs. James F. Dalton, was ever in the
possession of the grantee, Daniel Perkins, or any one of
the Perkins brothers mentioned in the escrow agreement.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
All the evidence shows is that eighteen years after the deed
was executed it was found in the hands of Donald Adams.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record to show how
Donald Adams came into possession of the deed, from whom
he obtained it, for whom he was holding it, or in what
capacity he obtained and was holding the deed.
Max Dalton testified (Trans. 40) :
When did you first see the deed marked
Exhibit 1?
"A. When I had Don making up these quitclaim deeds from Perkins.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.
deed.
"Q.

"A.

That is Donald Adams?
Donald Adams, and he had his quit-claim
The deeds from what Perkins?
Mrs. Hyrum C. Perkins and her children.

Then what?
"A. He said, 'I have the other deed,' and we
got it, looked at it and noticed it wasn't recorded,
and we took them both over and recorded them at
the same time."
"Q.

It will be noticed that this discovery of the alleged deed,
executed by 1\ir. and Mrs. Dalton and placed in escrow,
first appears in the possession of Donald Adams, in 1948,
eighteen years after it vvas placed in escrow, without any
explanation as to how or from whom he received the deed.
There is no evidence in the record that Donald Adams was
holding the deed as a part of the papers of the H. C. Perkins
estate except the statement of the defendant Max Dalton
that Donald Adams had been the attorney for the H. C.
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Perkins estate (Trans. 41) ; and as far as this record is
concerned, in 1948, when this deed was found in the office
of Donald Adams, it was found in the possession of a perfect stranger to the ti tie ; and there is no evidence that the
deed (Def. Ex. 1) was ever delivered by the escrow agent
to Daniel Perkins, grantee, or to any of the Perkins brothers. We submit that if the warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1)
was placed in escrow, it was incumbent upon ~he defendants
to prove that the terms of the escrow had been performed
and that the deed had been delivered by the escrow agent
to Daniel Perkins, the grantee, or to some one of the Perkins brothers mentioned in the escrow agreement (Def.
Ex. 2).
We agree that the law is well settled that in a case,
where there is no escrow agreement involved, the possession
of the deed by the grantee creates a prima facie presumption that the deed was delivered to the grantee, but no such
presumption prevails where the deed executed by the grantor is placed in the hands of a stranger to be delivered to
the grantee. In the case of Lewis vs. Tinsley, ( 124 A. L.
R. 459) the court said:
"While it is natural and reasonable to presume
from the possession of a deed that the title was delivered to the grantee by the grantor, and that the
grantor intended to convey title, the fact here
compels the question of whether this presumption
of delivery which arises from the possession of the
deed, should remain after it is shown that the deed
was not placed in the possession of the grantee by
the grantor but came to the grantee by the hands of
a third person. The fact here is clear that the deed
came into possession of Bert through the hands of
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Mr. Buel, as stated above, the natural presumption
is that if a person has possession of a deed in which
he is named the grantee, that he obtained such possession from the grantor, who, when he placed the
grantee in possession of the deed, intended to convey
title. Would this presumption continue when it is
shown that the dee.d was not placed in possession of
the grantee by the grantor, but came to his possession by some third person? It appears to us that
when this fact (delivery by some person other than
the grantor) is shown, that the underlying reason
which justifies the presumption has ceased to exist."
In Huber vs. Williams, (170 N. E. 195) the Illinois
court held that if the deed is in possession of a third person
at the grantor's death, that the grantee has the burden of
proving delivery. In Evans vs. Taylor, (182 N. E. 809) the
court held that the unexplained possession of a deed by a
third party after the grantor's death raises no presumption
of delivery and if custody of deed by any other person in
whose possession it was left by the grantor was intended
for grantee, it was incumbent upon the one claiming under
deed to prove the delivery. In Eddy vs. Pender, (159 Atlantic 727) it is held that possession of the deed acquired
after grantor's death rebuts the presu1nption of delivery
from possession of the instrument by the grantee. In Smith
vs. Peltz, (51 N. E. 2nd 534) the Illinois court held that
where possession of a deed is received by grantee after the
death of grantor, there is no presumption of delivery, the
facts constitute a prima facie case against a valid delivery.
In the case of Leu·is vs. Tin.sley, (124 A. L. R. 459) the
court said:
"The- presumption of delivery of a deed shown
to be in possession of the grantee is overcome when
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it appears that it came to the grantee through the
hands of a third person, as the presumption itself
is that the deed was delivered by the grantor to the
grantee.
"The facts and circumstances attending the
transaction must be such as to show that the grantor
intended the deed to be delivered by the custodian
to the grantee. The delivery to a third person raises
no such presumption as that such delivery is for the
use of the grantee, and it is incumbent on those
claiming under the deed to make proof of the fact."
In the case at bar the evidence shows that the deed
purported to have been executed by James F. Dalton and
Minnie Pearl Dalton (Def. Ex. 1) was executed on the 27th
day of October, 1930 and placed with the San Juan State
Bank in escrow. There is no evidence of payment for the
property in accordance with the terms of the escrow agreement, but Mrs. Dalton testified that there had never been
any money paid to them under the terms of said agreement
(Trans. 104). In 1948, Kisten Perkins, the widow of Hyrum
C. Perkins, deceased, Dorothy P. Jones, Beverly P. Alexander, Calvin J. Perkins, Richard C. Perkins, and Margaret
P. Tennity, the heirs at law of Hyrum C. Perkins, conveyed
the property in question by quit-claim deed to the defendant,
Max Dalton. At the time of this conveyance, Donald Adams
was n1aking up this quit-claim deed. Donald Adams, at that
time attorney for the defendant Jtllax Dalton, told the defendant Max Dalton that he had the other deed. This was
eighteen years after the deed· was executed and three years
after the death of James F. Dalton that the deed first appeared unrecorded in the office of Donald Adams, without
any evidence as to from who he received possession of the
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deed. Can a court assume from a mere statement of the
defendant Max Dalton that the deed was in the office of
Donald Adams and that Donald Adams had six years earlier
probated the estate of Hyrum C. Perkins, that the escrow
agreement had been completed and the deed delivered to
Hyrum C. Perkins, and that the deed was a part of the
H. C. Perkins estate? We think not.
H. C. Perkins died October 31, 1939, and letters of administration were issued on November 28, 1939, and the
final distribution of the estate was. made and the proceedings closed on the 21st day of April, 1942 (Def. Ex. 5, p.
13-14) and that the estate of H. C. Perkins had been closed
six years before the deed was found in the possession of
Donald Adams without any evidence to show when he came
into possession of the deed or how he came into possession
of the deed or from whom he obtained it. Certainly the
mere fact that the deed appeared in Donald Adams' office
six years after the probate proceedings had been closed
would not justify the court in concluding that it was a part
of the H. C. Perkins estate papers and had been delivered
to H. C. Perkins during his lifetime.
It seems almost incredible that if the terms of the escrow agreement had actually been complied with and the
deed actually delivered by the bank to H. C. Perkins during
the lifetime of the grantor, and the deed was a part of the
papers of the H. C. Perkins estate, that Donald Adams, as
attorney for the estate, \vould not have recorded the deed
at least son1etime during the process of the administration
of the estate. But eighteen years after the execution of
the deed and six years after the estate of H. C. Perkins was
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closed, the deed first appears in the possession of Donald
Adams as a perfect stranger to the title. The defendant
Max Dalton testified (Trans. 38) :
"Q.

How long have you had control of the

property?
"A. I bought it from the H. C. Perkins estate
in 1941.
"Q.

"A.

What did you pay for the property?
$500.00, as I remember."

The abstract of title shows that he did not buy the
property from the I-I. C. Perkins estate, because the property was distributed to the heirs of the H. C. Perkins estate
in April, 1942. Six years after the estate of H. C. Perkins
was closed the defendant took from the heirs of the H. C.
Perkins estate a quit-claim deed when the heirs had a good
and marketable title, as shown by the abstract of title (Def.
Ex. 5). If there had been a compliance with the terms of
the escrow agreement and the deed had actually been delivered to H. C. Perkins· during his lifetime and it was a
part of the papers of the H. C. Perkins estate, it seems incredible that Donald Adams would have advised the defendant Max Dalton, then his client, to take only a quitclaim deed to the property (Trans. 43) .
"Q.

Then of course Kisten gave you the deed?

"A.

Yes.

Why didn't you ask for a warranty deed?
You had paid $500.00 for only a quit-claim deed?
"Q.

"A.

Under advice of Donald Adams."
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Under the advice of Donald Adams, the defendant Max
Dalton took only a quit-claim deed. It seems almost incredible that if the terms of the escrow agreement had been
complied with and the delivery of the deed made to H. C.
Perkins and the deed was actually a part of the H. C. Perkins estate, that Donald Adams would not have recorded
the deed sometime during the process of probating the
estate of H. C. Perkins, and there would have been no hesitancy on the part of Donald Adams to advise the heirs of
H. C. Perkins to give the defendant Max Dalton a warranty
deed instead of a quit-claim deed to the property in October,
1948. \Ve have in this case the unique situation where a
deed executed in 1930 and placed with an escrow agent,
and 18 years after its execution and three years after the
death of James F. Dalton, and six years after the H. C.
Perkins estate had been distributed and closed, the deed
first appears in the hands of Donald Adams, one of the
attorneys in this action, unrecorded, without any evidence
whatsoever explaining how or when he obtained possession
of the deed. We submit that under the facts in this record
justice would require the defendant Max Dalton to prove
by competent evidence that there had been in fact a delivery of the deed and that Donald Adams was holding the
deed as a part of the papers of the H. C. Perkins estate and
not as a perfect stranger to the title, before any presumption could possibly arise that the escrow agreement had
been complied with and that there had been a delivery by
the bank to H. C. Perkins in accordance with the escrow
agreement. We submit that the facts in this record overcome any presumption of a delivery of the deed by the
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escrow agent that might prevail, because of the deed being
found in the hands of Donald Adams.
If Donald Adams was the attorney for the H. C. Perkins estate and the deed (Def. Ex. 1) was found among the
papers of the H. C. Perkins estate, evidence of payment
would also have been with the deed among the papers of
H. C. Perkins, if payment had in fact been made. Before
the trial of this case the plaintiff submitted interrogatories
for answer by the defendant Max Dalton (R. 9) :
"Interrogatory No. 5 : If such an agreement
was entered into and a deed executed on or about
June 1, 1927, were they placed in escrow? If so,
when?
"Answer: We do not know."
Since these answers were prepared by Donald Adams,
defendant's attorney, it certainly can be presumed that
neither Donald Adar.o.s or the defendant lVIax Dalton had
defendants' Exhibit 2 in their possession at that tin1e, because the letter itself (Def. Ex. 2) was addressed to the
bank and recites "I hand you herewith a deed," etc.
"Interrogatory No. 7: If there was such an
agreement, was payment made according to the
terms of the agreement?
"Answer: lVe do not know."
Since Donald Adams had possession of the papers of
the H. C. Perkins estate, if payment had been made he
should have had the evidence of payment; but the defendant answered that he did not kno"'N whether payment had
been made or not.
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We submit that the evidence in this record does not
show that warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) was ever in the
possession of Daniel Perkins or any of the Perkins brothers mentioned in the escrow agreement, but that the deed
was found in the office of Donald Adams, a perfect stranger
to the title, and that the burden of proof was upon the defendants to at least show by evidence that there had been
a valid deli very of the deed by the escrow agent, and to
whom the delivery was made. The defendants did not
assume this burden.
POINT III.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE DEFENDANT MAX DALTON HAD
ACQUIRED TITLE TO THE PROPERTY BY
VIRTUE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION.
Adverse possession is an affirmative defense and must
he affirmatively pleaded (Civil Rules of Procedure (8-C)).
The defendants filed and answer to plaintiff's complaint,
but did not affirmatively plead adverse possession. At the
trial of the case, leave was granted to amend the answer of
the defendants Max Dalton and Nell Dalton, and the answer
was. amended so as to include as an affirmative defense
Sections 78-12-5 and 78-12-6, U. C. A., 1953 (Trans. 3).
The trial court found in its findings of fact and conclusions of la\V that by reason of the provisions of Sections
78-12-5, 78-12-6, 78-12-7, 78-12-8, 78-12-9 and 78-12-12, U.
C. A. 1953, the plaintiffs were forever barred from claiming any interest in the property. It cannot be determined
\Vhether court's opinion was based upon the two sections
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of the statute pleaded in the defendants,' answer, or one or
more of those enumerated by the court and not properly
pleaded by the defendants.
Since neither of the sections pleaded by the defendant
Max Dalton constitutes a defense under the evidence offered
by the defendant, the plaintiffs had no burden of offering
evidence and no evidence was offered by the plaintiffs on
the question of adverse possession.
The abstract of title (Def. Ex. 5) shows that the record
title to the property was in the name of James F. Dalton
until November 5, 1948, when the alleged deed from James
F. Dalton to Danie1 Perkins (Def. Ex. 1) was recorded
and the quit-claim deed of Kisten A. Perkins, Dorothy P.
Jones, Beverly P. Alexander, Calvin J. Perkins, Richard C.
Perkins and Margaret P. Tennity, heirs of Hyrum C. Perkins, to l\1ax Dalton (Def. Ex. 5, p. . . ) was executed and
recorded. Plaintiff's action was filed on the 18th day of
June, 1955, well within the seven years, so that at the time
of the commencement of the action the plaintiff was seized
of the property within seven years and well within the
provisions of Sections 78-12-5 and 78-12-6, U. C. A.
Since Sections 78-12-5 and 78-12-6 were the only sections affirmatively pleaded by the defendant Max Dalton
the court committed error in applying the remaining sections of the statute enumerated by the court in determining
the question of adverse possession by the defendant. But
even if the remaining sections as set forth by the trial court
but which had not been properly pleaded, are deemed to
have been properly pleaded by the defendant Max Dalton,
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there is still insufficient evidence in the record to justify
the trial court's decision that the defendant Max Dalton
had acquired title and the right of possession by virtue of
adverse possession.
Section 78-12-8, U. C. A. 1953, provides:
"UNDER WRITTEN INSTRUMENT OR
JUDGMENT.-Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into
possession of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding such claim upon a
written instrument as being a conveyance of the
property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, and that there has been
a continued occupation and possession of the property included in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some part of the property under such
claim, for seven years, the property so included is
deemed to have been (held) adversely, except that
when the property so included consists of a tract
divided into lots, the possession of one lot is not
deemed a possession of any other lot of the same
tract."
Max Dalton testified (Trans. 37) :
When did you first go into occupancy of
that property. First I will ask you this: Do you
have possession of that property at the present
time?
''A. \V ell, I think so, yes.
"Q.

"Q.

How long have you had control of the

property?
"A. I bought it fron1 the H. C. Perkns estate
in 1941."
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The alleged purchase of the property by the defendant
Max Dalton from the Perkins estate was oral and there
was no evidence offered of any written instrument of any
kind evidencing the sale and purchase of the property in
1941. It was by virtue of this alleged oral agreement with
the Perkins estate that the defendant first entered into
possession in 1941. So that clearly under the evidence the
defendant entered into possession not under the terms of
any -vvritten instrument, but purely under the terms of an
alleged oral sale, and in order for the defendant Max Dalton
to acquire title by adverse possession under circumstances
such as these, where there is no written instrument, he
would clearly have to comply with all of the provisions of
Section 78-12-11. There is no evidence in this record that
the defendant Max Dalton fenced the property or that he
had cultivated the property or that he had expended any
money on the property, one of which would clearly be necessary under the provisions of 78-12-11.
Section 78-12-9 provides :
"WHAT CONSTIT·UTES ADVERSE POSSESSION UNDER WRITTEN INSTRUMENT.-For
the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by
any person claming a title founded upon a written
instrument or a judgment or decree, land is deemed
to have been possessed and occupied in the following
cases:
"{1) Where it has been usually cultivated or
improved.
"(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
"(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been
used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber for
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the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for
the ordinary use of the occupant.
" ( 4) Where a known farm or a single lot has
been partly improved the portion of such farm or
lot that may have been left not cleared or not inclosed according to the usual course and custom of
the adjoining county is deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part improved and cultivated."
This section sets forth the requirements that are necessary in order for the defendant to have acquired title by
adverse possession where he claims title by adverse possession, having entered into possession under a written agreement. The defendant Max Dalton acquired a color of title
to the property in question October 1, 1948 by virtue of a
quit-claim deed from the heirs of the H. C. Perkins estate
to the defendant Max Dalton (Def. Ex. 5, p. 15) and he
continued in possession until the commencement of this
action on June 18, 1955, a period of only six years and
eight months, so that no title could vest in the defendant
~J:ax Dalton by virtue of Section 78-12-9 because seven
years had not elapsed between the acquisition of the title
by virtue of the said quit-claim deed and the filing of
plaintiff's complaint. The defendant Max Dalton was not
only not in possession of the property for the full period
of seven years as required in Section 78-12-9, but the nature
of the defendant's possession was not of the nature as required by Section 78-12-9. There is no evidence that the
defendant had made any improvements. There is no evidence that the defendant had fenced the property. There is
no evidence as to whether the property was fenced or un-
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fenced. The only evidence in the record concerning the occupancy of the property was the evidence of the defendant
Max Dalton who testified (Trans. 38) :
What have you used the property for?
"A. Well, it was kind of run down so we have
used it for grazing livestock.
"Q.

Has it always been used for that purpose?
"A. Well, when I was a little boy they had
hayricks on it, and raised alfalfa.
"Q.

Who is 'they' you refer to?
"A. I think my uncle Frank, which is James
F. Dalton. He lived on it when I was a little kid."
"Q.

The only evidence offered on the question of use and
occupancy was the defendant Max Dalton's statement that
he had used the land for grazing. There is no evidence as
to how much the land was pastured; whether it was winter
or summer or just in the winter, whether the whole tract
was pastured or only a part of it. There was absolutely no
evidence that the defendant's pasturing of the land was
exclusive, and that it had not also been pastured by the
Daltons or others acting as their agents or others not acting
as the agents of the Daltons. There is absolutely no evidence sho-vving that the pasture of the land by the defendant ]tiax Dalton was anything more than a mere trespass.
The mere fact that the defendant l\fax Dalton had pastured
the land in question, even if exclusively, is not sufficient for
him to acquire title by adverse possession under Section
78-12-9 (No. 3). There was no evidence offered by the
defendant Max Dalton as to what the use of the land was.
The only evidence on the subject offered at all was the
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statement by the defendant Max Dalton that he had used
the land for grazing, and it is evidenced from Mr. Dalton's
own testimony that the land had previously been used by
the Daltons for other purposes than grazing. The land was
improved, cultivated ground. It had been used by the Daltons for raising hay (Trans. 38). In the case of 221 Pac.
2nd 1037, a recent Utah case, this court said:
"The rule that title to real property may be acquired by adverse possession if it is grazed by an
adverse claimant during the grazing season is limited
to land which, because of its character, are reasonably suited to grazing purposes only, and has not
been extended by the courts to include lands which
can be cultivated during non-grazing months of the
~year.''

In order to acquire title to land by adverse possession,
it is elemental that the possession of the one who claims
adverse possession must show that his possession was exclusive to that of all others. 1 A. M. J. 870 states this rule:
"It is unanimously agreed that to be adverse
the possession must be exclusive, not only as against
the true owner, but also as against the whole world,
except only the government."
There is absolutely no evidence in this record that the
possession of the defendant Max Dalton was exclusive. He
merely stated that he had used the land for grazing. There
is no evidence that the plaintiffs themselves or their agents
had not also used the land for grazing during that same
time. So the evidence in the record clearly fails to show
that the possession of the defendant Max Dalton was exclusive.
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Adverse possession being an affirmative defense, the
burden of proof was clearly upon the defendant to prove
every single element of adverse possession ( 1 A. M. J. 925).
The defendant Max Dalton testified that he owned the
adjoining land and that he used the land for the purpose
of grazing. There is no evidence even that the properties
were separated by a fence. The using of plantiff's ground
under such conditions would amount to nothing more than
a trespass by the defendant Max Dalton. The use of property for grazing under such circumstances would not give
notice to the plaintiff that the defendant Max Dalton was
claiming the property adversely to her under a claim of
right. The occupancy must be of such as to reasonably give
notice to the owner that the property is being claimed adversely. In this case, the plaintiff's land and the land of
the defendant were adjoining properties, and under the
testimony of Max Dalton himself, the Dalton property has
been used for cultivation for the purpose of raising hay,
and the mere grazing of the plaintiff's land by the defendant is not such an open and notorious use of cultivated
ground and would give the plaintiff notice that her land
was being claimed by the defendant Max Dalton. This rule
is \Veil stated in 1 A. ~A:. J. 874:
"§ 140.-NECESSITY AND SUFFICIENCY:
One of the requisites of adverse possession is that
the possession of the disseisor must be open and
notorious. The mere possession of the land is not
enough for this purpose. An adverse possession entirely excludes the idea of a holding under the true
owner. It is the knowledge, either actual or imputable, of the possession of his lands by another, claiming to own them bona fide and openly, that affects
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the legal owner thereof. It is, therefore·, essential in
all cases that the owner shall have notice to that
effect. If he has actual notice, that will, of course,
be sufficient in itself. Where, however, there has
been no actual notice, it is necessary to show that
the possession of his disseisor was so open, notorious, and visible as to warrant the inference that
the owner must, or should have known of it; otherwise, a mere trespass might be evidence of ouster."
In the case of Perry Estate vs. Ford, (151 Pac. 59) this
court followed the generally accepted rule that the possession of the defendant, in order to ripen into a title by adverse possession, must be so open and notorious as to reasonably give notice to the owner that the land was being
claimed adverse to the owner. In this case the court said
"The chief ground on which a disseisor acquires
his title by adverse possession is latches of the
owner, in seeing his boundary and land invaded by
an adverse claimant and himself remaining passive
and acquiescing in such adverse claim and assertion. Hence the general rule that the possession of
an adverse claimant must be continuous, exclusive,
open, hostile and notoriops, and of such a character
as to enable the owner to know of the invasion of
his rights."
Certainly under the facts of this case the mere grazing
of the plaintiff's ground, which had been used by the plaintiff for farming, by the defendant Max Dalton, an adjoining neighbor, could not in and of itself be sufficient notice
to the plaintiff that the defendants were claiming the
property adversely.
To acquire title to another's property by adverse possession, the claimant must not only be in possession of the
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property, but he must pay the taxes for seven years. The
defendant lVIax Dalton first entered into possession, according to his testimony, in the year 1941 under an oral agreement of sale from the Perkins estate, but did not get the
deed until 1948 (Trans. 38). So that from 1941 to 1948
the property was assessed in the name of the Perkins estate
and the defendant IVIax Dalton paid the taxes for the Perkins estate (Plaintiff's Ex. D). Now Defendants' Exhibit
2, the escrow agreement, explicitly provided that the Perkins brothers would pay all the taxes during the life of the
escrow agreement as part of their agreement with James
F. Dalton, and if Max Dalton did in fact undertake to buy
the property from the Perkins estate he was paying the
taxes for the Perkins estate, who were bound under the
escrow agreement to pay the taxes until such time as the
escrow agreement had been complied with and the deed
delivered. Since there is no evidence as to when the escrow
agreement \Vas complied with, there is no evidence as to
when the defendant Thfax Dalton commenced paying the
taxes adversely to the plaintiff. The defendant Max Dalton
acquired a quit-claim deed to the property on October 21,
1948 (Def. Ex. 5, p. 15). Plaintiff's Exhibit D shovvs that
the defendant Max Dalton paid the taxes for the year 1948
for the Perkins estate, who were still bound under the
escrow agreement to pay the taxes until the escrow agreement was complied with, and there was no evidence as to
when the escrow agreement was complied with. The defendant Max Dalton received the deed to the property from
the heirs of the Perkins estate on October 21, 1948, so that
the first' taxes that were actually paid by Max Dalton that
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were not being paid in compliance with the terms of the
escrow agreement were paid by him for the year 1949.
Now the taxes for the year 1955 were not due at the time
of the filing of plaintiff's complaint, so that the defendant
has not actually paid the taxes for seven years adversely to
the plaintiff.
SUMMARY
The plaintiff in this action filed an action to quiet title
to certain real property in San Juan County, Utah. The
defendants Max Dalton and Nell Dalton filed an answer
claiming ownership of the property and claiming title
through a deed executed by James F. Dalton, dated October
27, 1930 and recorded November 5, 1948. The defendants
offered evidence that the warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) purported to have been executed by James F. Dalton and l\1innie
Pearl Dalton was placed in escrow with the San Juan State
Bank. The plaintiff Minnie Pearl Dalton denies that she
ever signed the said warranty deed or the alleged escrow
agreement, or that they ever received any money according
to the terms of said escrow agreement. That the evidence
is entirely insufficient on which to base a finding that
James F. Dalton and Minnie Pearl Dalton ever executed
the warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1), and there is most certainly
insufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Minnie Pearl
Dalton executed said warranty deed.
Since the deed was not found in the possession of the
grantee, the possession of the deed by the defendant creates
no presun1ption that the escrow agreement had been complied with and that there had been a delivery to the grantee
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by the escrow agent, and the defendant failed to assume
the burden of proving a valid delivery of the deed.
The defendants. also claim title to the property by
adverse possession, and the court so found. Adverse possession is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded. The
defendants pleaded only Sections 78-12-5 and 78-12-6, U.
C. A. 1953; and clearly since the plaintiff was the title
holder until November 5, 1948 and the action was filed June
18, 1955 the plaintiff was well within the seven-year period
in bringing this action.
The defendants have not acquired title by adverse possession under any of the provisions of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The defendants claim to have entered into
possession of the property under an oral agreement of sale
with the Perkins estate in 1941 (Trans. 38), and to have
paid the taxes on the property since that time. The evidence
does not show that the defendant Max Dalton complied with
any of the provisions of Section 78-12-11 defining adverse
possession not founded upon a written instrument. On
October 21, 1948 the defendant Max Dalton acquired title
to the property by a written instrument, a quit-claim deed
from the heirs of the H. C. Perkins estate. But the defendant had not been in possession under this deed for seven
years prior to the commencement of this action by the
plaintiffs, which action was filed June 18, 1955.
The possession of the defendant was not of such a
nature as to give the defendant title by adverse possession.
The plaintiff's land was agricultural farm land used for
raising hay (Trans. 38), and this court has heretofore ruled
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that adverse possession of property by grazing alone- by
an adverse claimant is limited to land that is suitable for
grazing only (241 Pac. 1037). That the possession of the
defendant Max Dalton of plaintiff's property was not so
open and notorious as to give the plaintiff notice that it
was being claimed adversely to plaintiff. There is absolutely
no evidence that the defendant's possession was exclusive.
That from 1941 to 1948 the taxes were paid by Max
Dalton for the H. C. Perkins estate, (Plaintiff's Ex. D),
and the I-I. C. Perkins estate was legally bound under the
terms of the escrow agreement to pay the taxes until such
time as the terms of the escrow agreement had been complied with, and there is no evidence as to when the terms
of the escrow agreement had been complied with, if they
had been complied with at all. So that as it appears from
this record, Max Dalton paid the taxes for the H. C. Perkins estate for the years 1941 to 1948, which was legally
bound to pay the taxes. And the period from October 21,
1948 when the defendant Max Dalton acquired a deed up
to the filing of plaintiff's complaint on June 18, 1955 is a
period of less than seven years, and there had only been
six years' taxes due and paid by Max Dalton. The taxes
for the year 1955 were not due and payable at the time of
filing of plaintiff's complaint.

CONCLUSIONS

.

There is insufficient evidence to sustain the court's
finding that the plaintiff Minnie Pearl Dalton and her deceased husband sig-ned and executed a warranty deed (Def.
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Ex. 1), and particularly the plaintiff Minnie Pearl Dalton.
The warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) never having been found
in the possession of the grantee or any of the Perkins
brothers mentioned in the escrow agreement (Def. Ex. 2),
there was no presumption that the escrow agreement (Def.
Ex. 2) had ever been complied with and the deed delivered
to the grantees, and the burden of proof was on the defendants to explain how the deed (Def. Ex. 1) came into the
possession of Donald Adams, defendant's attorney, eighteen
years after its execution, three years after the death of
the grantor and six years after Donald Adams had completed probate proceedings of the estate of H. C. Perkins.
The defendants did not assume that burden. The court
committed error in finding the deed executed by James F.
Dalton and the plaintiff Minnie Pearl Dalton (Def. Ex. 1)
had been validly delivered and the defendants, being subsequent grantees, had acquired title to the property described
in plaintiff's complaint.
That the evidence in this record is insufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant Max Dalton had acquired
title to the property by adverse possession under the provisions enumerated by the court of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND R. BRADY and
DEAN E. FLANDERS,
Attorneys for Appellants.
616 Judge Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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